

# FREEZING OUT FARMERS: THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION AND THE USE OF FOREIGN AID AS A POLITICAL TOOL IN NICARAGUA

THE NICARAGUA TEAM  
WITNESS FOR PEACE

Angela Rayo, one of the leaders of a farmer's cooperative in Posoltega – a small rural Nicaraguan town forty minutes outside of the northern Pacific city of León - points excitedly to the concrete foundations of what will soon be her cooperative's offices and headquarters. "A group of ten women began this cooperative four years ago," she explains. "We realized that it was only working together - working as women because many of our men leave Posoltega to find work – that we would be able to move forward. And now look what we have achieved. We have twenty-three members now, all but one of whom is a woman, and we are building our offices here."

As Angela speaks a dry, hot wind rustles the leaves of banana trees, the crop that the farmers of Angela's cooperative depend on for their incomes, stretching out to her right. The sight of these lush and thriving banana trees during the midst of the dry season is new to Posoltega. "The help that we have received in our work has been very important for us," Angela tells me. "In other years we were not able to produce bananas in the dry season, only when there were rains in the winter. Now, with the help of the Millennium Challenge Account, we can produce all year round. We have been able to install irrigation systems and now we can also fertilize our soil all year. This is important because in the winter, when all of the banana harvests come in, the price of bananas on the market goes down. Now we can produce and receive better prices during the dry season when bananas are in demand. Selling bananas is how we make money." María Luisa Aragón, another member of the cooperative, adds, "Our children have to travel to attend the high school, which is about half an hour away, so we need the money to pay for transportation. And now, of course, we are building our offices. We are organizing. This help has been incredibly important."

Angela's cooperative was selected last year to begin receiving funds from the Nicaraguan Millennium Challenge Account (MCA-Nicaragua). With the assistance of MCA-Nicaragua, fourteen of the twenty three cooperative members now have irrigated plots. Fertilizers, which many rural producers have trouble affording, have been made available to the women. MCA-Nicaragua is the in-country entity responsible for managing money donated to Nicaragua through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the newest face of United States foreign aid. This article will take a critical look at the MCC model of aid distribution and the recent controversy surrounding the freezing of Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account funds. It will



Members of the women's farming cooperative in Posoltega. From left to right: Girlanda Castelo, Angela Rayo and María Luisa Aragón. The women stand in front of the foundations for their cooperative's new headquarters and offices. They attribute much of their recent success to support from MCA-Nicaragua.

argue that freezing MCC aid to Nicaragua is an ineffective and inhumane political tactic and will offer suggestions for a much-needed reevaluation of the MCC model.

The MCC, which is structured as a private business with a Chief Executive Officer and a board of directors (the Secretary of State is the chair of the board), is responsible for making decisions about which countries will receive funding from a congressional allotment. The receiving country and the MCC then sign a "compact agreement" outlining the structure of the aid programs. Nicaragua signed a compact agreement in 2005 and was granted \$175 million, with the money designated for projects focusing on the development of infrastructure, rural business and property titles in the departments of León and Chinandega (on Nicaragua's Pacific coast). Since then construction has begun on three new roads in these regions and over 1,600 producers have benefited from the rural business projects alone.

From the offices of the Nicaraguan Millennium Challenge Account in León, Country Director Juan Sebastian Chamorro talks about what he sees as the biggest positive of the Millennium Challenge Corporation aid model: country ownership. "Country ownership means two things. First, the receiving country decides where to put money, not the donor country. Second, the programs are run in-country. We (MCA employees) are all Nicaraguans. I, as the director, am Nicaraguan. We live here in Nicaragua." This component of the MCC



Banana plants at the women's cooperative in Posoltega. MCA-Nicaragua funds have helped 14 cooperative members irrigate their plots, allowing them to produce bananas year-round and sell for higher prices.

model has been seen as a progressive development in the distribution of United States aid. Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, an emphasis on country ownership allows for certain programmatic adjustments in order that projects address more closely each country's particular needs. This is a "big change," says Chamorro, "because the United States' aid has been criticized in the past for supporting the missions of U.S. non-governmental organizations rather than focusing on a country's needs." With this emphasis on country ownership also comes increased accountability for programs run by MCA-Nicaragua. MCA-Nicaragua is overseen by the Nicaraguan government, by the comptroller general and by members of the United States Congress, and receives visits from the United States embassy. This "intense oversight from different angles is positive in my view, because it allows me to better do my job," says Chamorro.

But there is another component to the "new and innovative" Millennium Challenge Corporation model. It is a component which, in the last few months, has been emphasized as the United States has frozen MCA-Nicaragua funds and threatened the complete termination of MCA-Nicaragua, putting in jeopardy the livelihoods of farmers such as Angela and the many others that have benefited from MCA programs.

### **The Freezing of Nicaragua's Millennium Challenge Account**

A newly redesigned Millennium Challenge Corporation website advertises the MCC aid model as an example of "smart power." Using the concept of "smart power," it is explained, the MCC can be seen as "an important tool of US government foreign aid assistance"

that changes "expectations about assistance, builds capacity within partner countries, and paves the way for increased private sector assistance." "Smart power" is exercised through the MCC's requirement that countries receiving assistance must meet certain standards in regards to "policies that promote political and economic freedom, investments in education and health, the sustainable use of natural resources, control of corruption, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law, as measured by 17 different policy indicators" if they are to be eligible to receive MCC funding. These indicators are developed by organizations including Freedom House, the World Bank Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the International Monetary Fund. Using the indicators, the MCC creates "scorecards" for countries in order to evaluate their adherence to the standards. Countries deemed not to be satisfying these requirements based on the indicators, the MCC website reports, will not be eligible for a compact agreement with the MCC. Countries that have signed compact agreements must uphold their commitments to these standards.

On November 9, 2008, elections at the municipal level were held in Nicaragua. These elections were accompanied by widespread accusations of fraud, with the governing Sandinista party denounced for barring the participation of two political parties, disallowing international observation, and tampering with ballots. Two weeks later, on November 25, Chief Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, John Danilovich, released a statement announcing the freezing of MCA-Nicaragua funds. The MCC, he said, would not make funds available for any new projects pending a review of the compact, noting that he was "not satisfied that the electoral process in Nicaragua ha(d) been conducted in accordance with the principles upon which the MCC awards and delivers grants." The Board of Directors of the MCC, at a December 11<sup>th</sup> meeting, decided to keep the account frozen pending another review 90 days thereafter, giving the Nicaraguan government time to, in the words of Danilovich, "do all it can to reestablish what has been an effective partnership."



Millennium Challenge Account headquarters in León. MCA funds have been frozen and the termination of programs is threatened.

Inside the US embassy in Managua officials spoke of the Millennium Challenge Account funding as a “reward” for good governance. The accusations of fraud surrounding the municipal elections were evidence that Nicaragua no longer merited this “reward” on the part of the United States. One official expressed concern that, were no punitive measures to be taken against Nicaragua, the entire credibility of the Millennium Challenge Account model would come into question.

### **Holding the Millennium Challenge Corporation Accountable to its Own Standards**

By looking at those same indicators that the Millennium Challenge Corporation relies upon to decide if a country qualifies for an aid package, and comparing the performance of Nicaragua to the performance of other countries that have signed compact agreements in effect for the fiscal year 2009, we can ask a key question: Is Nicaragua, according to the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s own standards, performing more poorly than other participating countries?

According to the fiscal year 2009 scorecard for Nicaragua, produced by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Nicaragua is scoring below the median within its peer group (countries in similar economic situations) in five ranked areas: control of government corruption, government effectiveness, primary education expenditures, land rights and access, and business start-up [see Table 1 – all tables at end of article]. There is a difference between the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 scorecards in the area of “control of government corruption” (which presumably takes into account the criticized November elections) of .001 on the index score (a 1% change). This means that before the November elections, Nicaragua was already considered to be below the median in the category of “control of government corruption” according to the MCC, but at that time the indicator did not disqualify Nicaragua from compact eligibility.

Now, take a look at the scorecards of other participating countries. El Salvador, which recently signed a compact agreement, ranks below the median in seven categories, including rule of law, primary education expenditures, girl’s primary education completion, natural resource management, land rights and access, business start-up and fiscal policy [see Table 2]. Morocco, a country with a compact agreement, ranks below the median in eight categories: political rights, civil liberties, voice and accountability, immunization rates, health expenditures, primary education expenditures, and fiscal policy [see Table 3]. Armenia, also in a compact agreement, ranks in the red on eight of seventeen indicators, including political rights, civil liberties, control of government corruption, rule of law, voice and account-

ability, immunization rates, health expenditures and fiscal policy [see Table 4]. Significantly, Armenia’s ranking on the “control of government corruption” indicator is drastically worse than Nicaragua’s (-.22 on the index, or 23% to Nicaragua’s 50% with 100% being the highest score). Looking at Nicaragua’s performance on the MCC indicators in comparison to these other country’s performances, one can see that Nicaragua is in fact ranking more highly in a greater number of categories than other countries whose compact agreements have not been called to question.

Bringing these figures to light is meant neither to argue that these other MCC aid receiving countries are “undeserving” of their compact agreements nor to condone any fraud that may have occurred in Nicaragua’s elections. What they do show, however, is an inconsistency in the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s

**“There are many women working here who before were unemployed. Unemployment is a big problem. If the fund leaves, these women will be out of work again.” –Paulina Rebecca Castellón**



*Above:* Paulina Rebecca Castellón, who oversees a tree farm outside of Leon, stands in a nursery. MCA-Nicaragua has funded her cooperative’s reforestation projects. The projects have provided much needed employment for women around Posoltega.

*Below:* Two women that have found employment at the nursery prepare bags for seedlings.



approach to Nicaragua in comparison with other participant countries. Could this be attributed solely to increased press attention surrounding the November elections? It seems unlikely when one considers that press attention surrounding the recent killing of over 25 members of the political opposition by police in Madagascar, an MCC compact country, has not elicited a response from the MCC. Colombia, whose egregious human rights record has been tracked by Witness for Peace and a number of other organizations, was recently deemed “compact eligible” by the MCC.

### **An Inhumane Tactic: Foreign Aid as a Political Tool**

Why, then, is Nicaragua being held to different standards by the Millennium Challenge Corporation than other participant countries? The scenario suggests that MCC projects and monies are being used more explicitly as political tools than the United States government is willing to admit. The freezing of MCA Nicaragua funds is the first major disruption in relations between the United States and the administration of Daniel Ortega since his reelection in 2007, but it is one that follows in the wake of nearly 30 years of animosity between U.S. government and corporate interests in Nicaragua and Ortega’s politics. When Ortega was president of Nicaragua in the 1980’s the Reagan administration viewed the Sandinista government as a great enough threat to U.S. interests in Latin America that it waged a proxy-war by providing funding to a Contra army whose military tactics destabilized the country throughout the decade. The United States provided funding to Violeta Chamorro’s campaign for the presidency in 1990, when the Sandinista’s handed over power in elections. Over the next 16 years the United States consistently supported non-Sandinista candidates. In the 2001 presidential elections, then-governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, openly campaigned for Enrique Bolaños, claiming that Daniel Ortega was allied with terrorists. As it became clearer that Ortega might regain his presidential seat in 2007, former U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Paul Trivelli, signaled that the U.S. might reevaluate its aid package to Nicaragua if the Sandinista party was to win the elections. With the freezing and threatened termination of Nicaragua’s Millennium Challenge Account it appears that the U.S. government may now be taking just such a step.

There is a disturbing aspect to this approach by the United States. International aid money, rather than supporting specific foreign governments, is presented as aid to foreign *citizens* of impoverished countries. The distribution of foreign aid is thus an issue of humanitarian concern, and when politics come into play it is nearly always the civilian population that suffers most. Indeed, the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s structure for the distribution of funds assures that aid money entering Nicaragua will be used for the specific purposes outlined

**“It is not only my family that benefits. It is all of the people that I hire to work with me. That is how their families afford food. This is what we are talking about.”**

**– Benito Mendoza Velazquez**

Below: Benito Mendoza Velazquez (left) and Agustin Velazquez at a tree farm near Posoltega. The farmers have been receiving seedlings and technical assistance from the Millennium Challenge Account



in the compact agreement. By creating a separate entity for the distribution of MCA funds, space for the manipulation or misuse of these funds by the Nicaraguan central government is nearly eliminated. Terminating the account would have an immediate and direct impact on the projects and people that the account supports. Benito Mendoza Velazquez, a farmer who grows and sells five different species of wood on his farm outside of Leon, and who has received technical and financial assistance from the MCA since its inception, shakes his head when asked what the result of a termination of the funding would be. He then motions to the piles of wood workers were recently cutting. “All this would be gone. The help is necessary. Without it we would be broken. It is not only my family that benefits. It is all of the people that I hire to work with me. That is how their families afford food. This is what we are talking about.”

On the other hand, it is unlikely that terminating the MCA funds would have a marked influence on Nicaragua’s politicians. As one MCA-Nicaragua official explained, “our (MCA) money does not go to the country’s budget at all. It does not go to make debt payments. It is not used for finances.” Because the central government will not feel the loss of MCA-Nicaragua directly, Octavio Villalobos, who facilitates MCA-Nicaragua’s rural business projects, says, “There is no doubt those most injured (by a termination) would be the producers.” Slashing the Millennium Challenge account in Nicaragua would amount to a punishment of Nicaragua’s already impoverished population in an attempt to make a political statement whose effectiveness is highly questionable. This would be neither a humane nor a rational tactic for the United States to take.



Benito Velazquez's cooperative has received seedlings and technical assistance from MCA-Nicaragua for its nursery. Wood is sold to companies for the construction of homes.

### **The Neoliberal Foundations of the Millennium Challenge Corporation**

Much of the historical contention between the United States government and the Sandinista party comes from the Sandinista rejection of a neoliberal economic model in the 1980s. While the United States and International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank promote economic policies that emphasize privatization, the removal of barriers to trade (such as tariffs and governmental subsidies), and a limited governmental role, the Sandinista government of the 1980's moved to nationalize some of Nicaragua's major industries and focused efforts on social programs such as education and health care.

When Chamorro's government, supported by the United States, won the 1990 elections neoliberal policy came back to Nicaragua in full force. Nicaragua began taking loans from the International Monetary Fund which were conditioned upon structural adjustments that advocated the privatization of businesses such as the state-run electrical company, mandated that Nicaragua use significant parts of its budget to pay off debt, and led to cut-backs in social spending. Free Trade Zones, delineated industrial areas in which companies set up factories nearly completely free of tax requirements, were reintroduced to Nicaragua and, most recently, the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed between the United States and Nicaragua. DR-CAFTA pushes for the reduction of tariffs on imports, encourages Nicaragua to make use of its comparative advantages (which happen to be a cheap labor force that foreign companies can make use of and the promotion of certain niche crops), and grants investors significant power to hold the Nicaraguan government accountable if business profits are threatened by, for example, environmental laws. The theory behind such policy argues that increased foreign investment in Nicaragua will bring wealth into the country which can then trickle down throughout society. The facts show Nicaragua to be, after 19 years of following this policy, an incredibly impoverished country in which approximately 75% of the population survive on less than two dollars per day.

Though the current Ortega administration has not been quite as explicit in its rejection of the neoliberal model as the Sandinistas of the 1980s were, his rhetoric condemning U.S. hegemony in Latin America and Nicaragua's participation in the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an alternative trade model supported heavily by Hugo Chavez's government in Venezuela, signal some resistance to the U.S.-backed neoliberal economic model. That this tendency is of concern to the United States government and the Millennium Challenge Corporation can be deduced by taking another look at the stated goals of the MCC.

As the corporation's website tells us, one of the main objectives of MCC projects within partner countries is to "pave the way for increased private sector investment." Indeed, six out of the seventeen indicators that the MCC uses to judge a country's qualifications for MCC loans deal with "economic freedom," and analyze what the risks are for private businesses that might want to establish themselves within host countries. These indicators come from groups such as the Heritage Foundation (which advertises itself as a public policy research institute that formulates and promotes "conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense") and the International Finance Corporation (a member of the World Bank Group that attempts to offer an "escape from poverty" through the promotion of "open and competitive markets in developing countries" and the "support (of) companies and other private sector partners"). MCA-Nicaragua projects work to achieve exactly these goals. The three main focuses of MCA-Nicaragua, as mentioned earlier, are infrastructure development (\$106 million) in order that access to national and international markets is increased, the formalization of land titles (\$24 million) in order to encourage private investment, and assistance to rural businesses (\$36 million) in order that producers are better informed about and better able to access markets. Because there is a requirement that these projects demonstrate "income generation" (or an actual cash influx to beneficiaries) they are not specifically aimed at issues of base poverty such as food security.

The bottom line is that foreign aid from the United States through the Millennium Challenge Corporation is only made available to countries that have adopted - to an "acceptable extent" - neoliberal policies. Rather than emphasizing a population's needs in the administering of foreign aid, the MCC model requires that "suitable conditions" for private enterprise exist within countries that receive aid. The theory, once again, is that if the private sector flourishes the money

invested will eventually trickle down and improve the economic condition of an entire population. Unfortunately, experience has not shown this to be the case. Though some of the MCC projects are laudable and even necessary - especially considering the preexistence of treaties such as DR-CAFTA that Nicaragua will not be able to take advantage of without advances in infrastructure - they fail to address the root causes of poverty in Nicaragua. Private investment has not been able to solve issues such as the lack of basic social services like health care and education – even in the United States.

### **Conclusions**

In conclusion, Witness for Peace urges that parts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation model be reevaluated. It is important to recognize both the positive and negative aspects of the model as it now exists. The emphasis placed on “country ownership” appears to be a progressive step in the development of U.S. foreign aid. Country ownership allows projects to accurately address specific issues that face each particular aid recipient, making room for the significant input and direction of projects by the organizations and citizens of receiving countries themselves. Country ownership should continue to play a role in U.S. foreign aid projects. However, the MCC should review the role that private enterprise plays in its aid model. By using indicators of “economic freedom” rooted in the neoliberal model, the MCC assures that only countries that have adopted neoliberal policies are eligible for assistance. This component of the MCC model is severely limiting. Historical evidence shows that private enterprise has not been able to adequately address the social factors that contribute to poverty. Foreign aid should address human, not corporate, advancement.

We must also recognize that MCA-Nicaragua has funded enormously important projects that producers such as Angela, Benito and Paulina rely upon. Witness for Peace takes a strong stance against the freezing and threatened termination of MCA-Nicaragua by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. According to the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s own indicators, Nicaragua is performing well in comparison to other countries that have signed compact agreements. The freezing of Nicaragua’s account must therefore be viewed as a blatant attempt to use a withdrawal of foreign aid money as a political tool in order to punish the Ortega administration. Witness for Peace believes that this is an inhumane and ineffective tactic. Because MCA money does not go directly to the Nicaraguan government, the Ortega administration will not be directly impacted by the freezing or termination of the account. It is the Nicaraguan population – the farmers and construction workers benefiting from MCA projects – that will suffer most if the MCA is terminated. Foreign aid is an issue of humanitarian concern, and its use as a political tool only hurts already impoverished populations.

Girlanda Castello concluded her interview with these heart-wrenching words: “We are here and we are praying to God that the funding does not leave because it is us, the poor women, who will suffer.” Now is the time for citizens in the United States to stand in solidarity with women like Girlanda and pressure the MCC not to terminate Nicaragua’s Millennium Challenge Account. Let your representatives know that foreign aid should not be used for political maneuvering, but should concern the real, human needs of the citizens in impoverished countries.

### **Sources:**

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Velazquez, Benito Mendoza and Agustín Velazquez. Interview. Posoltega, Nicaragua. February 23, 2009

Villalobos, Octavio. Interview. León, Nicaragua. February 23, 2009.

### **Note:**

All tables retrieved from the Millennium Challenge Corporation website ([www.mcc.gov](http://www.mcc.gov)) on February 25, 2009.

**Table 1: Nicaragua's MCC Scorecard: Fiscal Year 2009**

**Ruling Justly**

Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability	
Data	27 (81%)	37 (78%)	0.00 (50%)	-0.09 (36%)	0.02 (53%)	0.54 (78%)
Median	17	Median 30	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00

**Investing in People**

Immunization Rates	Health Expenditures	Primary Education Expenditures	Girls' Primary Education Completion	Natural Resource Management	
Data	93 (77%)	4.29 (84%)	1.72 (48%)	76.7 (62%)	78.88 (84%)
Median	81.5	Median 2.23	Median 1.80	Median 69.2	Median 65.17

**Economic Freedom**

Regulatory Quality	Land Rights and Access	Business Start-Up	Trade Policy	Inflation	Fiscal Policy	
Data	0.31 (73%)	0.619 (50%)	0.834 (31%)	79.2 (86%)	11.1 (22%)	0.3 (65%)
Median	0.00	Median 0.619	Median 0.898	Median 68	Max. 15	Median -1.3

**Table 2: El Salvador's MCC Scorecard: Fiscal Year 2009**

**Ruling Justly**

Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability	
Data	33 (83%)	40 (60%)	0.32 (80%)	0.15 (63%)	-0.21 (33%)	0.25 (67%)
Median	24	Median 36	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00

**Investing in People**

Immunization Rates	Health Expenditures	Primary Education Expenditures	Girls' Primary Education Completion	Natural Resource Management	
Data	97 (70%)	4.13 (67%)	1.41 (24%)	92.5 (38%)	71.92 (21%)
Median	95	Median 3.18	Median 1.99	Median 98.3	Median 84.41

**Economic Freedom**

Regulatory Quality	Land Rights and Access	Business Start-Up	Trade Policy	Inflation	Fiscal Policy	
Data	0.36 (87%)	0.718 (43%)	0.931 (41%)	81.8 (86%)	3.9 (67%)	-2.3 (29%)
Median	0.00	Median 0.729	Median 0.962	Median 75.6	Max. 15	Median -0.6

**Table 3: Morocco's MCC Scorecard: Fiscal Year 2009**

**Ruling Justly**

Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability	
Data	16 (40%)	28 (27%)	0.21 (73%)	0.31 (77%)	0.32 (60%)	-0.43 (30%)
Median	24	Median 36	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00

**Investing in People**

Immunization Rates	Health Expenditures	Primary Education Expenditures	Girls' Primary Education Completion	Natural Resource Management	
Data	95 (50%)	1.83 (10%)	1.87 (44%)	79.2 (8%)	87.79 (64%)
Median	95	Median 3.18	Median 1.99	Median 98.3	Median 84.41

**Economic Freedom**

Regulatory Quality	Land Rights and Access	Business Start-Up	Trade Policy	Inflation	Fiscal Policy	
Data	0.04 (57%)	0.769 (61%)	0.980 (79%)	88.0 (96%)	2.0 (93%)	-2.0 (36%)
Median	0.00	Median 0.729	Median 0.962	Median 75.6	Max. 15	Median -0.6

**Table 4: Armenia's MCC Scorecard: Fiscal Year 2009**

**Ruling Justly**

Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Control of Corruption	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability	
Data	14 (33%)	28 (27%)	-0.22 (23%)	0.07 (57%)	-0.04 (47%)	-0.40 (37%)
Median	24	Median 36	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00	Median 0.00

**Investing in People**

Immunization Rates	Health Expenditures	Primary Education Expenditures	Girls' Primary Education Completion	Natural Resource Management	
Data	90 (30%)	1.93 (17%)	2.32 (68%)	100.5 (58%)	96.46 (89%)
Median	95	Median 3.18	Median 1.99	Median 98.3	Median 84.41

**Economic Freedom**

Regulatory Quality	Land Rights and Access	Business Start-Up	Trade Policy	Inflation	Fiscal Policy	
Data	0.40 (97%)	0.913 (96%)	0.984 (86%)	86.4 (93%)	4.4 (56%)	-2.1 (32%)
Median	0.00	Median 0.729	Median 0.962	Median 75.6	Max. 15	Median -0.6